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Abstract
One of the key challenges in the success of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) is to consider the location privacy of drivers.
Although, the pseudonym changing approach is suggested by standardization development organizations such as IEEE and ETSI,
the development of an eﬀective pseudonym changing strategy is still an open issue. The existing pseudonym changing strategies are
either not eﬀective to protect against the pseudonyms linking attacks or can have a negative impact on the VANETs’ applications.
To address these issues, this paper proposes a new pseudonym changing strategy based on the Vehicular Location Privacy Zone
(VLPZ), which is a roadside infrastructure designed and dedicated to change the pseudonyms. Existing roadside infrastructures
such as gas stations and toll booths are considered as typical places to implement a VLPZ. An analytical model based on queuing
theory is developed to evaluate the location privacy protection achieved at a VLPZ using the size of vehicles’ anonymity set as a
metric.
c© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
We are now witnessing the ﬁrst steps of the deployment of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs). This technol-
ogy is mainly developed to enhance safety and eﬃciency in transportation systems through a variety of promising
applications ranging from safety-related applications like collision warning to non-safety-related applications like
infotainment.
Many safety-related applications need a beaconing service where each vehicle periodically broadcasts an authen-
ticated safety message (beacon). This latter is broadcasted in clear text with a high frequency and includes status
information about the vehicle such as its identiﬁer, its position, its speed, and its acceleration1. Even though this
message signiﬁcantly helps in road safety, it can also be exploited by the adversaries for an unauthorized location
tracking of vehicles.
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Due to the nature of the wireless medium, a passive adversary can easily eavesdrop the broadcasted messages,
relate them according to the static vehicle identiﬁer and determine the locations visited by vehicles over a period of
time. This can compromise the location privacy of drivers since there is usually a strong correlation between a vehicle
and its driver2. Indeed, knowing a driver’s position can lead to disclosure critical information about his life, which can
expose him to many problems. For example, having information about a hospital visits frequency may lose employer’s
interest in the employee3.
Thus, the location privacy protection of drivers is important because the lack of protection may impede the deploy-
ment of the VANET technology4. A common approach to avoid this problem is that vehicles use multiple identiﬁers
called pseudonyms, instead of static identiﬁers5. In the public key infrastructure (PKI), the pseudonyms represent
a set of certiﬁed public keys stored in the vehicle’s On-Board Unit (OBU)5. Vehicles can then periodically change
their pseudonym to mitigate the tracking of their positions. As long as pseudonyms can not be linked to each other,
they can provide the required location privacy protection. However, several conducted studies6,7,8,9 demonstrated that
the pseudonyms can be linked with a high level of accuracy by performing the pseudonyms linking attacks. Two
types of pseudonyms linking attacks have been distinguished6 (presented in Section 2). To combat such attacks, many
strategies have been proposed to provide an eﬀective pseudonym changing. However, until now, there is no strategy
that has been adopted by standardization bodies10.
The existing pseudonym changing strategies can be sorted in terms of their eﬃciency to prevent the pseudonyms
linking attacks into three categories: (i) strategies that rely only on a mechanism to synchronize the changing of
pseudonym processes between vehicles11,12,13,14,2. These strategies showed their weaknesses against a passive adver-
sary that uses the contents of the safety messages to link the pseudonyms. This type of attacks is called the semantic
linking (presented in Section 2.2), (ii) strategies that propose to encrypt the safety messages for some periods of
time15,16,17. These strategies are also broken since it may exist some internal passive adversaries that have the de-
cryption keys. Hence, the contents of the safety messages are disclosed to these adversaries, which can also provide a
clue to the external global passive adversary to perform the semantic linking of pseudonyms. In addition, decrypting
these messages adds a processing latency, which may not meet with real-time requirements of safety-related appli-
cations18, and ﬁnally (iii) strategies that use the radio silence technique6 19,20 21,22. The strategies of this category are
more eﬀective than the previous ones since they can provide the protection against both external and internal passive
adversaries. However, using the radio silence technique in VANETs is challenging since safety-related applications
may get aﬀected due of this23.
To avoid the limitations of the existing pseudonym changing strategies, this paper proposes a new pseudonym
changing strategy based on the Vehicular Location Privacy Zone (VLPZ). The VLPZ is a roadside infrastructure
designed and dedicated to change the pseudonyms. The existing roadside infrastructures such as gas stations and toll
booths represent typical places to implement a VLPZ. The proposed strategy provides the protection against the two
types of pseudonyms linking attacks with preserving road safety. An analytical model based on queuing theory is
developed to evaluate the location privacy protection achieved at a VLPZ using the size vehicles’ anonymity set as a
metric.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the types of pseudonym linking attacks.
The system model and the considered adversary model are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the VLPZ-based
pseudonym changing strategy and discusses its eﬃciency and its applicability. The performance evaluation results are
presented in Section 5. Finally, the conclusion is given in Section 6.
2. Pseudonyms Linking Attacks
The tracking of vehicle’s positions can be performed even with the frequently changing of pseudonyms. This can
be done using the pseudonyms linking attacks. Two types of pseudonyms linking attacks have been identiﬁed by
Buttya´n and al in6. These types are described in the following subsections.
2.1. The syntactic linking
Figure 1 illustrates the syntactic linking of pseudonyms case. If duringΔt only one vehicle B changes its pseudonym
(from B1 to B2) among the three vehicles running on the road, the adversary can then easily link the pseudonyms B1
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and B2. The protection against this type of attacks can be performed through using a mechanism to synchronize the
changing of pseudonym processes between vehicles.
Fig. 1. The syntactic linking of pseudonyms.
2.2. The semantic linking
Figure 2 illustrates the semantic linking of pseudonyms. This attack is more powerful than the syntactic linking
of pseudonyms because the adversary relies on the information that is included in the safety messages to link the
pseudonyms. For example, the adversary can predict the next position of the vehicle using a tracking method like7,9.
Then, based on this prediction the adversary can link the pseudonyms B1 and B2 even if the three vehicles, illustrated
in Figure 2, change their pseudonyms in the same time. The protection against this type of attacks can only be done
by preventing the adversary to get access to safety messages for some periods of time.
Fig. 2. The semantic linking of pseudonyms.
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3. System Model
3.1. VANET System model and Assumptions
As illustrated in Figure 3, we consider that the vehicular geographic area is partitioned as a grid. The cells of the
grid have a same predeﬁned size. These cells may comprise the entire downtown area of a small town or few city
blocks.
The system consists of vehicles, where each vehicle is equipped with an OBU device, which allows to a vehicle to
communicate with other vehicles. Each vehicle has a GPS navigation system, which includes a GPS receiver and a
digital map. This system allows obtaining the location and the current time. Each vehicle periodically broadcasts a
safety message every t milliseconds, where each message includes a location, a time, a velocity and a content. Before
joining the VANET, each vehicle registers with the CA (certiﬁcation authority). During registration, each vehicle Vi
is pre-loaded with a set of m pseudonyms Ki,k where k ∈ {1,..., m }, that are, public keys certiﬁed by the CA. For each
pseudonym Ki,k of vehicle Vi, the CA provides a certiﬁcate Certi,k(Ki,k). The safety messages are properly signed by
private key K−1i,k corresponding to the pseudonym Ki,k to ensure the authentication. A certiﬁcate is attached to each
message to enable other vehicles to verify the sender’s authenticity.
3.2. Adversary Model
In this paper, we are interested to study the location privacy protection against a strong passive adversary model.
This adversary is composed of an external global passive adversary and few internal local passive attackers. It aims to
track the target vehicle by eavesdropping all communications of any vehicle within a region of interest. The adversary
model is well aware of the system model and the proposed strategy design. However, it has no control on the VLPZ. In
addition, this adversary is not able to perform tracking using cameras, because the cost of global eavesdropping with
cameras is much higher than radio-based eavesdropping. Therefore, camera-based global eavesdropping is beyond
the scope of this paper.
Fig. 3. The vehicular location privacy zone model.
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4. VLPZ-based pseudonym changing strategy
4.1. VLPZ model
The Vehicular Location Privacy Zone (VLPZ) represents a roadside infrastructure managed by trusted regional
authorities like municipalities or directly by the country transportation department. Each cell of the grid contains at
least one VLPZ that aims to provide the location privacy protection to vehicles within the cell. The design of a VLPZ
is seemingly similar to the existing roadside infrastructures like gas stations. As illustrated in the Figure 3, a basic
VLPZ consists of one entry point called the router, one exit point called the aggregator and a limited number of lanes
l where l > 1.
4.2. Pseudonym Changing Strategy
The strategy of changing of pseudonym is executed as follows. The vehicles arrive to a VLPZ, one after another,
on a one-lane. They keep broadcasting safety messages until they enter the VLPZ. When a vehicle reaches the router,
it stops broadcasting safety messages and heads for an assigned VLPZ’s lane. The assigned lane is randomly and
privately selected by the router. The vehicle can reside inside a VLPZ for a random period of time. This period
mainly depends on the service time. For example, if we assume that a VLPZ is deployed in a gaz station, the service
time is the time taken by the driver to ﬁll the fuel tank of its vehicle. A vehicle must change its pseudonym before it
exits the VLPZ and all vehicles exit a VLPZ through the the aggregator. However, the exit order is diﬀerent from the
entering order since the residency periods of vehicles are random. We also assume that the aggregator can intervene
to select a certain order in random and private way.
4.3. Discussion
In the following subsection, we discuss the eﬃciency and the applicability of the proposed strategy. The VLPZ
provides protection against the two types pseudonyms link attacks: (i) it provides the protection against the syntactic
linking of pseudonyms because during the radio silence a vehicle changes its pseudonym with the set of vehicles that
exists inside a VLPZ at the same period of time. Therefore, the pseudonyms changes are synchronized, (ii) it provides
the protection against the semantic linking of pseudonyms because all vehicles maintain the radio silence and stay
a random period inside a VLPZ. Therefore, the adversary can not predict the exact exit time of a vehicle, and (iii)
it also provides the protection against FIFO attacks that can be performed by the adversary because the vehicles do
not leave a VLPZ in the same order that come with. In addition, diﬀerently from the strategies that rely on the radio
silence technique, the road safety is preserved in proposed strategy. Indeed, the managers of the VLPZ are concerned
to provide the road safety inside the VLPZ.
Besides of this, as the design the VLPZ is similar to the widespread roadside infrastructures such as gas stations
and toll booths, this strategy can easily be deployed in the real world. However, it is the task of the system designers
to select which roadside infrastructure best ﬁt to the VLPZ. In addition, the number of VLPZs that should be deployed
in a given cell can be computed according to a capacity planning study. This study should take into the account
parameters such as the traﬃc density in the cell and the capacity of each VLPZ.
5. Performance Evaluation
5.1. Analytical Model
In this subsection, we provide an analytic model to evaluate the level of the location privacy protection achieved
at a VLPZ. This level of protection mainly depends on the number of vehicles inside a VLPZ. For this reason, we
use the size of anonymity set as an evaluation metric. The anonymity set (AS) deﬁned as the set of vehicles that are
indistinguishable from the target with the set including the target itself19. At a VLPZ, the anonymity set actually
includes the target and all vehicles inside a VLPZ. The size of the anonymity set is then the number of vehicles that
the anonymity set includes.
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Fig. 4. M/M/1/K queue model.
In the following, we assume a given cell that contains a single VLPZ. We model the VLPZ as M/M/1/K queuing
system with a random service discipline, as shown in Figure 4. The vehicles arrive to the VLPZ according to a
Poisson process with a rate of λ vehicles per minutes. A vehicle resides inside a VLPZ for a random period of time
before leaving it through the aggregator. Therefore, the aggregator can be modeled as a queuing system server with
exponential service times. The vehicles are randomly served with a service rate μ vehicles per minutes. Let K be
the capacity of a VLPZ, that is the maximum number of vehicles in the system including the one under service. We
assume that the probability pn denotes that there are n vehicles in a VLPZ. According to the M/M/1/K queue model24,
we can derive that:
pn =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
1
K+1 ρ = 1
ρn 1−ρ1−ρn ρ  1
where ρ = λ
μ
, 0≤n≤K
The size of the anonymity set |AS| in the proposed strategy represents the average number of vehicles in the system
denoted by Ls. Ls can be calculated using the following formula:
|AS | = Ls =
⎧
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
K
2 ρ = 1
ρ[1−(K+1)ρK+KρK+1]
(1−ρ)(1−ρK+1) ρ  1
5.2. Numerical Results
In this subsection, we present the numerical results of the analytical derivation presented in the provious oue. We
assume that the arrival rate of vehicles λ to the VLPZ takes the following values 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 (vehicles/minute).
We also assume that the service rate μ takes the following values 4,5, and 6 (vehicles/minute). We consider the
capacity of the VLPZ is K=16 vehicles. Figure 5 shows the size of anonymity set entropy |AS| versus both of the
vehicles arrival rate λ and the service rate μ. From the Figure, we can see that |AS| increases with the increase of λ
and the decrease of μ. The reason is that the larger λ is, the more that vehicles will enter at the VLPZ. In addition, the
small μ values leads to more vehicles will be situated inside the VLPZ in the same time. As a result, more location
privacy protection will be achieved.
Obviously, the capacity of the VLPZ, K has a positive impact of the level of location privacy protection achieved by
the strategy. The larger K is, the more location privacy protection is provided. In addition, K also impacts the blocking
probability pK , which is the probability that a vehicle arrives to the VLPZ and ﬁnds it occupied. As illustrated in Table
1, pK decreases with the increase K. Thus, K should be taken as large as possible to provide more eﬃciency to the
VLPZ.
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Fig. 5. The size of anonymity set (K=16).
Table 1. Blocking probability pK versus the capability of the VLPZ K (λ = 5, μ= 5).
K 5 10 15 20 25
pK 0.1667 0.0909 0.0625 0.0476 0.0385
6. Conclusion
In this paper, we addressed the location privacy protection problem in VANETs. We proposed a new pseudonym
changing strategy based on the Vehicular Privacy Zone (VLPZ). The aim of this strategy is to provide an eﬃcient
changing of pseudonym with the preservation of the road safety. We also evaluated the achieved level location privacy
of the proposed strategy by performing an analytical evaluation based on a queuing system model. In our future work,
we will carry out a capacity planning study on the optimal number of VLPZs that should be deployed in a given cell.
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